1) Among scholars who publish regularly on climate, an overwhelming majority accept anthropogenic global warming.

2) Most of the scholars who contest anthropogenic global warming have a less credible scientific record than those who accept.

While this should not come as a surprise to anyone who has followed the debate on climate science, I doubt it will convince the skeptical public. The reason is that in addition to the most obvious interpretation of these facts — scientific expertise leads individual scholars to accept the strong evidence for climate change — alternative theories may resonate with skeptics:

1) Perhaps skeptics are systematically not allowed to publish in journals, so that they seem less experienced than other scholars?

2) Perhaps the public pressure to accept anthropogenic global warming is particularly heavy among top scientists?

3) Perhaps the authors of the study are themselves supporters of anthropogenic global warming, and thus use data selectively to make their case?

This brings us to the deeper problem with climate science and the media: it does not matter much how credible the evidence for climate change is, as long as influential special interests continue to benefit  from  contesting it. Almost any fact regarding the credibility of climate science can be explained away using a conspiracy theory, and individuals who are already inclined towards rejecting science are probably also inclined towards accepting such conspiracy theories. Thus, deeper institutional changes may be necessary to improve the public understanding of climate science.

Since industrialized countries consume a lot goods that are imported from developing countries, especially China, the total emissions from our consumption are higher than the total emissions from production. A recent study quantifies this effect using trade data from 2004 in 113 countries and 57 industry sectors. The authors find that US carbon dioxide emissions would increase by 2.5 tons if consumption, as opposed to production, was measured; in Europe, the figure exceeds four tons.

What would follow if we were to measure emissions from consumption? First, industrialized countries would look even worse than they do today, and especially Europe’s performance would deteriorate. China’s situation would improve, as the country would be able to shift the blame for the surge in power generation from coal at least partially on the unlimited appetite for inexpensive consumer goods in the West.

Second, to measure consumption emissions would be a major administrative challenge. Production emissions are relatively easy to measure, as it suffices to account for the total consumption of fossil fuels (and add other greenhouse gases to that). However, consumption emissions cannot be measured without information on the carbon content of trade. Although the authors of the study cited above were only interested in estimating mean emissions from different sectors, they were unable to obtain data more recent than that from 2004.

Finally, if consumption emissions emerge as a serious alternative measure, intense bargaining can be expected. The European Union has a very strong incentive to oppose such a measurement approach, while China would enthusiastically support it.

In addition to these practical considerations, the normative question remains: who is responsible for emissions, the producer or the consumer? It seems to me that some kind of a shared responsibility would be the right way to go, but I am a bit worried that implementing such a scheme could be difficult in practice.

This is a stunning figure that reveals the deep flaws of energy policies in developing countries. According to standard economic theory, as well as common sense, the state should subsidize (tax) activities that produce public goods (bads). And yet we see developing countries waste hundreds of billions of dollars to increase pollution. Indeed, IEA’s chief economist, Fatih Birol, characterized phasing these subsidies out as the win-win-win solution: “Energy consumption will be reduced, CO2 emissions will be substantially reduced and it will increase energy efficiency.”

Why is phasing out energy subsidies so difficult, then? I am not terribly familiar with the literature, but common explanations include the influence of special interests (if you live in the United States, you should know how this works) and the public backlash from reduced subsidies when fuel prices go up.

In 2009, the G20 agreed to phase out fossil fuel subsidies by 2020. At this moment, it remains unclear whether this goal can be achieved. But if it is achieved, then the world has scored a major victory in the struggle to avert a climate crisis.

PS. The Global Subsidies Initiative seems to have a comprehensive section on fossil fuels. I have not read it yet, but it seems very good at first blush.

PPS. If you are aware of rigorous theoretical or empirical research on fossil fuel subsidies, please get in touch. The same goes if you are interested in exploring this topic in a more systematic fashion.

Another perspective to public opinion is whether the public understands how different policies actually work. It is clearly the case that very few people are interested in the details of complex policies, such as emissions trading or renewable portfolio standards. But do people understand the basics of these policies, such as the difference between emissions taxes and trading?

I am not aware of any systematic studies of the issue, but the anecdotal evidence gives some reason for pessimism. In surveys, people rate subsidies to clean energy very favorably but strongly oppose any measures to tax pollution. This is quite intuitive, as one policy instrument carries a positive connotation while the other appears in unfavorable light. But since subsidies must be funded from tax revenue (either now or later), the different framing is ultimately hiding the fact that each policy is effectively a tax.

Of course, pollution taxes and production subsidies are very different in many other ways. But if the people cannot get beyond the initial impression of bad taxes and good supportive measures, these other differences never enter the public debate.

This has some rather unfortunate consequences. For example, I have always thought that the following argument is very sensible:

- If we tax pollution, we protect the environment and reduce your income tax.

Here it is, a one-sentence argument for pollution taxes. It is not flawless, as pollution taxes generally hurt the poor more than the rich. But it should not be difficult to reduce the income tax more for the poor than for the wealthy to compensate for this regressive effect.

Unfortunately, it seems that even one-sentence arguments are too complicated to work in the real world. I am not sure exactly why, but it seems that understanding this problem would be very useful.

This point should be rather obvious by now, but the idea that humans are now the dominant force changing planet Earth is an important conceptual innovation. This claim was made and documented in 1997 by Stanford biologist Peter M. Vitousek in a hugely influential Science article, Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems. The term Anthropocene — the human epoch — was coined by Nobelist Paul J. Crutzen in 2000.

The conceptual innovation is important because it highlights an important aspect of our environmental crisis that appears to be very difficult for human beings to understand except on a very shallow level: we are really changing the planet in profound ways. Modern cultures seem view the environment as something remote that is out there, not the life-support system that we all depend on.

As a result, decision-makers discount environmental megatrends. If one could trace the origins of these immense changes to an evil human being — perhaps a terrorist leader residing in a foreign country — our leaders would declare a state of emergency and use any amount of resources to solve the problem right. While we understand our current condition on some abstract level, we are somehow unable to grasp the essence of the problem and treat it in a rational fashion.

To overcome this intellectual flaw is a gargantuan challenge, and having spent a good part of the day reading and writing about the politics of nuclear power in Finland, I am not feeling overly optimistic today. Nonetheless, concepts such as the anthropocene or human dominance of ecosystems may help by virtue of being fundamentally irreconcilable with the modern cultural view of the environment.

My favorite application of this reasoning is the idea that there is something inherently valuable in closing production systems, so that an industrial unit — possibly very broadly defined, depending on the context — produces very low amounts of pollution and waste.

According to textbook economics, this idea does not have any inherent value. Instead, societies should (i) carefully calculate the costs and benefits of pollution and waste and then (ii) use economic instruments, such as taxes, to correct the market failure.

But if we believe that the burden that we put on the global environment is immense, then we cannot calculate the costs and benefits of pollution and waste. It would be laughable to claim that we understand how the biosphere works, so we are left with choosing between (i) somewhat arbitrarily specifying the goal of closing certain production and consumption systems and (ii) running the risk of triggering global dynamics that we are unable to control.

To be sure, I am not advocating that societies begin to categorically proscribe pollution and waste. I am fully aware of the fact that some environmental destruction is unavoidable if we are to maintain decent standards of living for our current population (I am not going to digress into the population question here). But there is a world of difference between treating environmental destruction as yet another simple policy problem and committing to solving the global environmental crisis by closing our production and consumption systems as soon as possible.

Recently, scientists have made some progress towards dealing with this problem (at least on a theoretical level). In 2009, Johan Rockström and colleagues published an innovative article in Nature, proposing “a safe operating space for humanity” by identifying ten major environmental issues — from climate change to biodiversity loss and freshwater use — and proposing a threshold of interference (annual loss of species, carbon dioxide emissinons, etc) above which we are in a dangerous territory. They then proposed a safe boundary that is well below the critical threshold. The bad news is that we are already beyond the boundary for climate change, biodiversity loss, and the amount of nitrogen that we remove from the atmosphere.

These thresholds and boundaries are undoubtedly controversial and will greatly change over time, as different scholars weigh in (that’s how science works). But the idea of recognizing key factors that seem to shape the biosphere and proposing a relatively safe boundary that is well below the critical threshold for great danger is a sound one. Sure, it is neither an optimal yardstick for public policy nor completely fail-safe, but it is a simple decision tool for those of us enjoy the privilege and carry the burden of living in the anthropocene.

PS. This post has very little politics in it. As a political scientist, I am usually not inclined towards giving policy advice to the world — in case you haven’t noticed, the world is not an actor in its own right. But ultimately, any policy advice that I (or anyone else) can give is frivolous unless it is somehow grounded in a normatively appealing goal. The great scholarship that centers on the notion of anthropocene helps dream big.

This basic dilemma raises a question that is, in my view, one of the most fundamental in all of modern social science: how should public policies designed to ensure that they will enjoy a long and prosperous life? If we can answer this question, then we can, at the very least, avoid wasting precious opportunities to create a sustainable energy transition just because we did not understand the political economy of clean energy policy.

The answer to this question is by no means obvious. One seemingly plausible answer is that public policies should maximize cost-effectiveness or be broadly popular at the time they are enacted.

But this answer is incorrect. In politics, influence is often concentrated. Even if a policy is cost-effective, it may be costly to influential opponents, such as coal and oil companies. And it may have few vigorous defenders, because nobody really profits from it a lot. Concentrated costs and diffused benefits undermine the cost-effectiveness criterion. They also render popularity, however measured, a questionable measure of robustness in the long run.

Would it be enough to pass the best policy subject to political feasibility (whatever that means)? This is perhaps the most common way that policy analysts incorporate politics into their models. However, it is also not a very good answer. Political feasibility can perhaps tell us whether a policy can be passed now, but among those policies that are politically feasible, it does not tell which ones will survive in the future. It is rather pointless to triumphantly pass a policy that will be repealed the next day.

Analyzing this question is difficult because it will, I suspect, involve identifying positive feedback loops. By creating a public policy for clean energy, a policymaker is essentially creating her own green constituencies for the future. In Denmark, wind energy policies emphasized local ownership and thus created intense public support for continued support. In Germany, wind and solar equipment manufacturers are a powerful political force. Heck, even in the United States, clean energy producers have in recent years greatly increased their lobbying expenditures.

Of course, such public policies may also intensify the opposition to clean energy (thanks to Chris Marcoux for emphasizing this point). If proponents of dirty energy recognize it as potentially empowering clean energy producers, they may work even harder to undermine it than otherwise. So passing a truly robust public policy may well be particularly difficult.

At this point, I do not have a really good answer to this (If I did, I doubt I would have the time to write a blog). But I am nonetheless writing an academic paper on the topic. In that paper, entitled “A Political Rationale For Renewable Energy Standards,” I use game theory to identify the circumstances in which a renewable energy standard can help mobilize green constituencies. However, the model is very stylized and intended to provide a foundation for analyzing this question rather than answering it in any particular context.

The paper is not ready for prime time, so I will not publish it here or on my website yet. But if you are interested in seeing what I’ve been doing, send me a message and I’ll send you a draft.

In the paper, Antto paints a depressing picture of the coalitional dynamics in the global South. Documenting the history of the G77 bargaining bloc, he argues that developing countries’ interests regarding climate change are diverging:

1) The rapidly industrializing countries, especially China and India, are primarily interested in avoiding binding commitments and other sovereignty violations.

2) The oil exporters prefer no deal to any deal.

3) A number of radical countries, such as Bolivia and Venezuela, reject anything that the North proposes. This is convenient for the other power players that oppose binding commitments.

4) Small island states promote aggressive mitigation policy as a matter of survival.

Based on his analysis, Antto has very little faith in the effectiveness of leadership:

“Would more ambitious short term commitments by the North, or bigger and more precise figures in financing, have made a crucial difference to China? Very unlikely. Throughout the history of climate change negotiations China—as well as India—has carefully avoided international norms that might constrain its behaviour.”

I would agree with this statement, as applied to the possibility that China would suddenly reverse course and begin to aggressively reduce emissions. However, I am not sure that this must be the case in the long run.

Imagine (dream) for a while that the European Union and the United States, backed by other industrialized countries, agree on relatively ambitious emissions reductions. While this itself may not impress the Chinese government, it could trigger other dynamics in Europe and the United States that force China to rethink its position:

1) If American manufacturers no longer believe that emissions reductions can be avoided, their next best strategy is to push aggressively for carbon tariffs unless China reciprocates by reducing emissions.

2) One reason why Europeans have been hesitant to play hardball with China has been that they have not had any allies. But an understanding with the United States could change all this.

3) China’s main argument against mitigation has been US obstructionism. The reputational cost of not doing anything would go through the roof.

In addition to these threats, a transatlantic agreement on climate policy would surely also facilitate climate finance.

Alas, it seems unlikely that we’ll see anytime soon whether my optimistic scenario is plausible or not. But if I’m right, then the way forward goes through Washington, DC.

There are several potential reasons why skepticism is increasing. First, climate scientists were the subject of a great deal of negative publicity in late 2009 and early 2010 when e-mail messages from climate scientists at the University of East Anglia were hacked and a handful of errors were found in the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC.

Second, many parts of the United States and Northern Europe experienced an unusual cold winter. Recent research by political scientists Patrick J. Egan (New York University) and Megan Mullin (Temple University) shows that at least in the United States, local weather significantly influences whether people believe global warming is occurring. All this is somewhat paradoxical given that last April was globally the warmest ever recorded by NASA.

Finally, poor economic performance may also be a factor. If people are very worried about unemployment and finances, climate change loses importance as a policy problem. If people are uncomfortable with simultaneously believing that global warming is real and saying that it is not an important problem (cognitive dissonance), then bad economic times may lead the brain to solve the problem by downplaying the evidence for global warming.

However, it is important to remember that survey research is notoriously sensitive to how questions are framed. In a USA Today article, Stanford polling expert Jon Krosnick tells about his research indicating that the exact wording of survey questions drives the relative importance of global warming.

Public opinion may shift rapidly if the economy improves and the summer turns out to be warm. But in the long run, it is important to develop institutions that facilitate science communication. It appears as though mainstream media has somehow failed to give an accurate picture of the status of climate science.

Overall, the effect is slightly positive. But even this effects depends on the current, high employment levels. Under full employment, they probably would not have found a positive effect.

According to the analysis, and somewhat surprisingly to many, nuclear power is the main reason why the net employment effect is positive. The authors assume that the utilities constructing nuclear plants pass the cost to consumers only after the lengthy construction phase. Thus, nuclear power would temporarily increase demand for labor (positive employment effect) without increasing energy prices (negative employment effect).

Why the discrepancy between the “millions of jobs” that clean energy advocates promise and the meager effect that the authors found? The most optimistic estimates of green job creation are usually based on bottom-up models. These models estimate the gross effect of clean energy investment on employment, which is obviously positive. They do not allow for negative effects elsewhere in the economy, however, so they are bound to produce optimistic predictions.

Does it follow that green jobs are a myth? Not necessarily. As the authors themselves write, even the state-of-the-art hybrid model used cannot capture three key elements that the green jobs camp emphasizes:

1) The model does not incorporate changes in international competitiveness. Given the rapidly increasing demand for clean energy elsewhere in the world, the benefits might be significant. Of course, heavy public investment in the energy sector could also crowd out private research and development in other sectors. So this could get very complicated.

2) Market failures. The energy sector, both on the production and consumption side, is notorious for market failures. Consumers do not have enough information to choose products that are energy-efficient and barriers to entry are very high in the energy sector. Additionally, the government subsidizes fossil fuels. Standard economic models assume that markets operate flawlessly.

3) Innovation externalities. Since innovation produces positive spillovers, companies invest too little in it. Public investment might spur innovation, and this innovation could increase economic growth. But on the other hand, it is also true that they could crowd out innovation in other sectors.

In sum, the analysis is certainly a credible one — and therefore  a welcome addition to the debate on the American Power Act. But the fact remains that standard economic models ignore the most important questions regarding green jobs — especially market failures and innovation externalities. It will be interesting to see whether economists find a way to address these questions in a rigorous fashion.

While efforts to reduce emissions continue, it may well be that at some point, this is simply not enough. Carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, and there are several feedback loops in the nature that could cause runaway global warming. Faced with a total catastrophe, our political leaders may have to consider more drastic measures to save the human civilization.

If we must go there, then what options remain? The alternative to emissions reductions is a collection techniques called geoengineering. Instead of reducing emissions, geoengineering techniques reduce temperatures by directly manipulating the climate.

One prominent geoengineering approach is to deflect sunlight from Earth. For instance, one could use giant satellite mirrors in the space to reduce sunlight. Alternately, one could shoot particles into the upper atmosphere for the same effect.

Another class of techniques often included in geoengineering are based on extracting carbon dioxide from the air. My Columbia colleagues, Peter Eisenberger and Graciela Chichilnisky, have founded a company to commercialize air capture.

Why do geoengineering not figure more prominently in the public debate? The proponents of geoengineering would undoubtedly blame environmentalists for dogma, and there may be a hint of truth here. But geoengineering is also an unproven approach that may (i) fail to reduce warming or (ii) produce unintended side effects. This is especially true for techniques based on deflecting sunlight, as they interfere with natural processes on a massive scale.

What is attractive about geoengineering that it does not require large economic changes. If it turns out that we fail to achieve the emissions reductions necessary to avoid rapid global warming, geoengineering may offer a politically feasible alternative. According to my Columbia colleague Scott Barrett, geoengineering is not nearly as expensive as emissions reductions. In fact, he believes it may be so inexpensive that an individual major emitter is willing to unilaterally prevent global warming through geoengineering.

But of course, individual major emitters may use geoengineering in ways that hurt other countries, so we face a governance problem — who decides on geoengineering? Additionally, the presumption that geoengineering will be inexpensive is an unproven one.

Given these problems, I would say that emissions reductions are certainly a safer bet than geoengineering for the moment. But as I said in the second paragraph of this post, this may change unless our political leaders get their act together and begin to implement mitigation policies. Like it or not, geoengineering techniques will remain on the table for decades to come. Let’s hope we will not have any use for them.